ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we investigate properties of hierarchical aggregation of intensity preferences, i.e., aggregation of intensity preferences that in turn represent aggregate opinions of group of individuals.
Our results relate to the ongoing research work on axiomatic approaches to group decision-making in a fuzzy environment (see [4, 7, 8, 11] ). In particular, this paper is related to the model started in [9, 10] and subsequently characterized in [6] . Arrow's paradox in group decision-making (cf. [1] ) has been translated in these papers into a fuzzy context, showing that his negative result can be avoided in several ways. Aggregation of preferences will be obtained here through intensity aggregation rules that will allow the successive aggregation of alternatives. In particular we will show how this intensity aggregation rules can be combined in an hierarchical fashion and we will study what functional properties are preserved by the hierarchical combinations.
This approach reflects common events in real life. Consider for instance the following two extreme circumstances:
• Each member of a deciding committee expresses her/his opinion on the basis of a personal search of the whole society (usually democratic political parties in nonfederal states claim that they are expressing the best consensus laws for the whole country).
• The society has been divided into disjoint groups, in such a way that each member of the deciding committee represents the aggregated opinion of one of these groups (as in democratic federal states where each state is assumed to define its own aggregated opinion about any issue, to be aggregated with the other states opinions). In between these two extreme cases, global aggregated preference can be obtained by allowing individuals to influence any a priori fixed partial aggregations (social opinion is an aggregation of nondisjoint subsets, in such a way that some individuals have influence in more than one of these smaller groups). For instance,
• agreements between owners and workers in a firm are aggregations of two different groups that may not be disjoint. Some workers may own a portion of the firm and therefore their opinions have positive weight in both sides of any labor conflict.
In all of the above cases, the goal is to produce a social opinion. This goal may be reached in many ways. In [2, 3] , several measures of individual and group consensus are proposed, analyzed, and then used to generate associated measures of distance to consensus, by considering several common goals of group discussion. In the next section, we will introduce a degree of rationality (of the aggregation method) that in some way can be viewed as a particular goal in consensus procedures, allowing a measure of distance from consistency.
PRELIMINARIES
We will analyze hierarchical aggregation of individual fuzzy preferences in the context of the model proposed in [6] . At the basis of such a model are non-absolutely irrational (in the sense of [9, 10] ) complete fuzzy preference relations. That is each individual is assumed to be able to express her/his opinion about any possible set of alternatives through some complete fuzzy binary preference relation, allowing an aggregated group opinion in terms of another complete fuzzy preference relation. The above concepts are formalized as follows.
Let /x: X x X ---> [0, 1] be a fuzzy preference relation over an arbitrary finite set of alternatives X. /z(x, y) represents the degree to which the can be understood, respectively, as the degree to which the two alternatives are indifferent (xly), the degree of strict preference of x over y, (xBy, x is better than y) and the degree of strict preference of y over x (xWy, x is worse than y). A cycle of preferences will be defined over chains We say that a cycle is rational if it is not irrational. Then, given any fuzzy preference IX over a fixed set of alternatives and a chain of alternatives, we can look for all possible rational cycles of preferences, weigh them in a natural way and assign to the chain a degree of rationality (see [6, 9] ). Specifically, this is done as follows. Given a cycle C-xlP 2 ... XkPkX 1 where Ph c {B, I, W} for all h = 1, 2,..., k, the natural weight associated to C and denoted by A(C) will be
where Xk+ 1 : Xl for convenience.
Therefore, given a chain G = (x 1 -x z ..... x k -x~) a natural degree of rationality associated to G and denoted by A~,(G) can be defined as
As proven in [6, 9] , A~,(G) verifies
-A~(G)
In view of (2.3), once a finite set of alternatives X has been fixed, rationality can be defined as a fuzzy property A:
and where .~(X) is the set of all complete fuzzy preferences. Once a group of n > 2 individuals is fixed, we should be able to aggregate their opinions about any set of alternatives in a coherent way. Therefore, in [6] were defined aggregation operations that can take into account any extra alternative x so to properly extend any previous aggregated opinion relative to a collection of alternatives not containing x. The key properties are the standard conditions As a consequence, it is clear that the same intensity aggregation mapping ~b will be associated to any pair of alternatives and therefore each possible aggregation procedure is characterized by one of these intensity aggregation mappings.
For the time being, we will suppose that conditions IIA, UD, N hold. Given ~b and n individuals expressing their opinion on the set of alternatives X, the aggregated preference /x defined on X × X associated to ~b is defined as /z(x, y) = ~b(/xl(x, y),...,/z"(x, y)) Vx, y c X.
Standard ethical conditions may also be imposed on the intensity aggregation rules, among them:
• (NNR) Non-negative Responsiveness: • (U) Unanimity: if a i = a for all i = 1, 2 ..... n, then th(a 1, a 2 ..... a n) = a.
• (CS) Citizen Sovereign: for any given a ~ [0, 1] there exists a profile (a 1, a 2 ..... a n) ~ [0, 1] n such that dP(al,a2,...,a n) = a.
• (ND) Non-dictatorship: there is no individual i such that Definitions of completeness and rationality can be naturally extended to intensity aggregation rules.
In particular, an intensity aggregation rule is said to be complete if the associated aggregated fuzzy preference is complete for any profile of complete individual preferences.
The fuzzy property of rationality is extended to intensity aggregation rules in the following way. It is clear that in this way both individual and social opinions are required to belong to the set of Non-absolutely Irrational (NAI) complete fuzzy preference relations. Therefore, we are in fact modifying the unrestricted domain condition.
One characterization of complete intensity aggregations rules is given by the following lemma proven in [6] . •
The main result proven in [6] is the following. (ii) th(a 1 .... ,a n) = 1 impliesa i = 1 foralli = 1,2 ..... n.
• More specifically, from the proof of theorem 2.1. it can be concluded that in order for a complete intensity aggregation rule to be NAI, conditions (i) and (ii) are sufficient.
In the next section we will introduce our main definition and prove our main results.
HIERARCHICAL AGGREGATION RULES
Let us first introduce some useful notation. By [i 1, i 1 ..... i n ] we will denote the ordered list whose first element is i 1, second element is i2, and so on. I will denote the empty list and given a list L, ILl will denote the length of the list. Moreover, let • be the classical list concatenation or composition operator. So, given two lists L 1, L 2 with n = ILll and m = ILzl, L = L 1 .L 2 is the list of length n + m whose first n elements are the elements of L 1 and whose last m elements are the elements of L 2. Moreover, given a list L the notation j ~ L has the obvious intended meaning. Finally, given a list L we define the operator -k that produces the set of elements of the list L, i.e. ~L = {j: j ~ L}. 
. aim).
The following is our main definition. If a property P that holds for th0, ~bl, th2 ..... ~bc0 holds for ~b0(th 1 ..... $c0) as well (for any fixed cover) we will say that P propagates under hierarchical aggregation.
As a simple consequence of functional composition many properties propagate under hierarchical aggregation, among them completeness, non-negative responsiveness (NNR), positive responsiveness (PR), unanimity (U), and conditions (i) and (ii) of theorem 2.1.
Our first result is the following. • Concerning Citizen Sovereign, we observe that any nondecreasing intensity aggregation rule 4, satisfying CS must be a continuous mapping such that ~b(1,..., 1) = 1 and ~b(0 ..... 0) = 0. Therefore, if ~b 0, ~bl,..., ~bn0 are nondecreasing and satisfy CS, ~b is nondecreasing, continuous, and satisfies CS. Continuity is a very important property from a practical point of view. Indeed, jumps in the aggregation rule would imply that small changes in the input may produce big changes in the output, leading to aggregation rules that are not stable, according to the following definition. •
FINAL COMMENTS
In this paper we have introduced hierarchical aggregation on intensity preference. The practical importance of such aggregation rules is quite dear, since many complex group decision-making procedures are defined as hierarchical aggregations. Therefore, the fact that standard ethical conditions as well as rationality propagate under general conditions is a very significative result. Anonymity, in general, does not propagate, however we must notice that such an ethical condition is related to very specific problems and commonly assumed. Indeed, in many decision-making processes, individuals are not considered all equal but they are weighted according to various factors like for instance, the individual experience and knowledge of the specific subject. As a final remark about the usefulness of hierarchical aggregations, we recall the propagation of stability. Such a result, apart from its theoretical interest, legitimizes hierarchical aggregations from an applicative point of view, since it guarantees the stability of the whole process once it has been put into practice.
